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INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Emily S. Taylor Poppe*
Decades of empirical research have confirmed the prevalence of troublesome situations
involving civil legal issues in everyday life. Although these problems can be associated with
serious financial and social harm, they rarely involve recourse to lawyers or formal legal
institutions. Contemporary scholars and practitioners increasingly integrate this reality into the
definition of access to justice. They understand access to justice to be concerned with equality in
the ability of individuals to achieve just resolutions to the problems they experience, regardless
of whether they pursue formal legal action. To achieve this goal, an emerging international set
of best practices calls for access to justice interventions that are proactively targeted to those
groups most in need of assistance, linked to other social service providers, aimed at addressing
problems early to avoid escalation, and customized to the user’s capabilities. In stark opposition
to such an outward-facing, multi-faceted approach, the civil justice system is structured to
respond only to formal legal claims. We have few auxiliary institutions that provide alternative
avenues to resolution, and several barriers that inhibit their ability to address civil legal
problems. As a result, access to justice, as contemporarily understood, is largely an orphan
issue—a social problem for which no institution bears responsibility. In this Article, I propose
an agenda of institutional reforms to better align key social institutions with a contemporary,
evidence-based understanding of access to justice. These institutional reforms would enhance
individuals’ ability to access justice, within or without the courthouse walls.
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INTRODUCTION
At the last lecture of the semester, a 1L contracts professor once offered his
students a bit of advice: remember that not everything in life is a legal dispute.
In support, he asked his students to imagine an argument between a lawyer and
his significant other involving the couple’s pet. The lawyer, drawing on his
training in doctrine and rhetoric, approaches the disagreement legalistically,
framing the dispute in terms of enforceability, breach, and damages. With
vigorous advocacy, the lawyer wins the argument . . . and loses the significant
other.
By suggesting that not everything in life is best handled through a legal
dispute, the professor sought to counter the impulse, common among law
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students,1 to view the world through law-colored glasses.2 In fact, this legalistic
orientation is exactly what legal education is designed to accomplish. The
lawyers’ role is to determine how law can be brought to bear in a given situation.3
In training their students how to “think like a lawyer,” law schools teach them
to spot legal issues amongst the wreckage of unfortunate events4 and turn them
into legal claims.5 The law of the hammer predicts that experts come to
understand problems in ways that fit their expertise,6 and lawyers are no
exception.7

1 See, e.g., ALM Staff, ‘I Started Seeing Torts Everywhere!’ Big-Name Attorneys Recall Favorite Law
School
Classes,
LAW.COM
(Aug.
22,
2016,
10:55
AM),
https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/08/22/i-started-seeing-torts-everywhere-bigname-attorneys-recall-favorite-law-school-classes/ (recounting one lawyer’s recollection that he
“started seeing torts everywhere!” during his 1L year).
2 This might also be characterized as the “legal gaze.” See, MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 171–73 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
3 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (describing
the various roles that lawyers play—advisor, advocate, and negotiator—all of which draw on
legal knowledge, such as to “provide[] a client with an informed understanding of the client’s
legal rights and obligations,” “zealously assert[] the client’s position under the rules of the
adversary system,” and in “examin[e] a client’s legal affairs”).
4 See Elizabeth Mertz, Inside the Law School Classroom: Toward a New Legal Realist Pedagogy, 60
VAND. L. REV. 483, 495 (2007) (noting, in describing how law students are taught to understand
events in legalistic ways, that in presenting cases, law students “typically start by focusing on the
content of the story,” but “[f]irst-year law professors insistently refocus the telling of these
stories on the sources of authority that give them power within a legal framework”).
5 See Carl J. Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What Is Going
to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 SOCIAL PROB. 599, 608 (1979) (“Laws and rules
do not deal with individuals but with classes of empirical situations. One of the functions of
lawyers is to determine the nature of the empirical situations presented by an individual case. . .
. The successful invocation of [legal] remedies depends on the lawyer's ability to characterize
‘the facts’ of the case in appropriate and equally standardized ways.”).
6 ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY: METHODOLOGY FOR BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE 28–29 (Transaction Publishers 1998) (1964) (“I call it the law of the instrument . . . :
Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding. It
comes as no particular surprise to discover that a scientist formulates problems in a way which
requires for their solution just those techniques in which he himself is especially skilled. . . . The
price of training is always a certain ‘trained incapacity’: the more we know how to do something,
the harder it is to learn to do it differently.”).
7 See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation
of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 645 (1980) (“Lawyers . . .
help people understand their grievances and what they can do about them. In rendering this
service, they . . . define the needs of the consumer of professional services. Generally, this leads
to a definition that calls for the professional to provide such services.”) (citations omitted).
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This law-centric orientation is strikingly different from that of most
Americans, despite popular claims about their litigiousness.8 Most individuals
never even identify the civil legal problems they experience as “legal.”9 Only a
tiny minority will ever seek legal advice in response to a problem, and most are
more likely to do nothing than to file a lawsuit.10 Decades of empirical
scholarship have confirmed that despite the prevalence of civil legal problems
in everyday life, there is remarkably little recourse to formal law.11
A burgeoning movement among scholars and practitioners seeks to
incorporate this empirical reality into our understanding of access to justice.
While earlier conceptualizations of access to justice focused on access—to
lawyers, legal expertise, and legal institutions12—the emerging approach is
centered instead on justice. With the goal of equalizing individuals’ ability to
achieve just resolutions to civil legal problems regardless of whether lawyers or
courts are involved, it pragmatically seeks to acknowledge individuals’
disinclination to turn to law while nevertheless promoting their ability to achieve
justice.13
Realizing this objective requires expanding the access to justice toolkit. An
international set of evidence-based best practices suggests that access to justice
interventions be proactively targeted to those groups most in need of assistance,
linked to other social service providers, aimed at addressing problems early to
avoid escalation, and customized to the user’s capabilities.14 By enhancing
individuals’ ability to resolve civil legal problems, such interventions could
promote equality in their ability to thrive in society; without successful
interventions, inequalities in access to justice are likely to continue to reproduce
existing social and economic inequalities and perpetuate cycles of poverty.
8 DAVID M. ENGEL, THE MYTH OF THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY: WHY WE DON’T SUE 3 (2016)
(noting that “specious claims of a litigation explosion have been made so often that they have
rooted themselves in the national psyche”).
9 Rebecca L. Sandefur, What We Know and Need to Know About the Legal Needs of the Public, 67
S.C. L. REV. 443, 448 (2016).
10 See infra Section I.B.
11 Infra Section I.B.
12 Kristen M. Blankley, Online Resources and Family Cases: Access to Justice in Implementation of a
Plan, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2121, 2121–22 (2020) (“[M]ost scholars and practitioners use the
term ‘access to justice’ to include ideas such as access to a court, a lawyer, a mediator or
arbitrator, a settlement, or a court decision. Typical ‘access to justice’ initiatives include
suggestions surrounding drafting and filing documents, increasing legal aid and other pro bono
initiatives (including limited scope representation), providing legal services through
technological assistance, and increasing use of paraprofessionals to help people in need of legal
assistance accomplish routine tasks, among other things.”) (citations omitted); COMM’N ON THE
FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES IN
THE UNITED STATES 1, 6–7 (2016) (offering recommendations for addressing access to justice,
all of which involve access to courts, lawyers, or legal expertise).
13 See infra Section I.C.
14 See infra Section II.A.
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Unfortunately, our institutional infrastructure is poorly suited to deliver
these types of interventions. Responsibility for access to justice is primarily
assigned to the civil justice system, which is a reactive institution limited to
engaging with the “cases and controversies” before it.15 Thus, while it may work
to increase access to legal representation, offer alternative means of resolving
disputes, or provide resources for self-representation, it does so only in the
context of the tiny minority of legal problems that enter its domain. Meanwhile,
the vast majority of justiciable problems that people experience remain outside
the boundaries of the legal system in an institutionally barren no-man’s land. To
an extent not often recognized, access to justice is an orphan issue, a social
problem for which no institution bears responsibility.16
This has negative implications not only for individuals’ ability to resolve
justiciable issues, but also for the emergence of access to justice as a political
issue.17 Yet, we are living in a moment of upheaval—wrought by a global
pandemic,18 a divisive populist president,19 rising economic inequality,20 and a
reckoning with systemic racism21 and sexism22—that may produce an opening
to reconsider our commitment to equity in access to justice. In this Article, I
offer a blueprint for several institutional design reforms that might be
implemented to capitalize on such an opportunity.

See source cited infra, note 123.
See infra Section II.B.
17 See infra Section II.C.
18 COVID-19: United States Cases by County, JOHNS HOPKINS U. & MED.: CORONAVIRUS
RES. CTR., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/us-map (last visited Nov. 25, 2020).
19 See, e.g,, Gregory Eady, Justin S. Vaughn & Brandon Rottinghaus, Comparing Trump to the
greatest—and the most polarizing—presidents in US history, (March 20, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/03/20/comparing-trump-to-the-greatest-andthe-most-polarizing-presidents-in-u-s-history/; Harry Enten, Trump’s Unpopularity Isn’t New. It's
His
Normal
State.,
CNN
POLS.
(June
28,
2020,
8:49
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/28/politics/trump-approval-rating-analysis/index.html
(noting that, “Trump’s average net approval rating during his presidency has been the worst of
any president in the polling era”).
20 See, e.g., Katherine Schaeffer, 6 Facts about Economic Inequality in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR.
(Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/6-facts-about-economicinequality-in-the-u-s/ (reporting that, “[t]he wealth gap between America’s richest and poorer
families more than doubled from 1989 to 2016 . . . .”).
21 Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest
Movement
in
U.S.
History,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
3,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html
(reporting results of surveys suggesting that “about 15 million to 26 million people” in the
United States have participated in Black Lives Matter protests, which would make the protests
“the largest movement in the country’s history”)
22 See, e.g., Maya Salem, One Year After #MeToo, Examining a Collective Awakening, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/us/me-too-movement-women.html
(detailing the progress of the #MeToo movement).
15
16
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The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I describe the state of access to
justice today. Drawing on empirical research, I document the prevalence and
unequal distribution of justiciable problems and identify patterns of behaviors
taken in response. I then explain how this empirical understanding has
transformed our conceptualization of access to justice. In Part II, I describe the
mismatch between the types of evidence-based interventions that could
operationalize the contemporary conceptualization of access to justice and our
near-exclusive reliance on the judicial system, whose mandate largely excludes
such efforts. Part III contains my proposals for institutional design for access to
justice.
I. ACCESS TO JUSTICE TODAY
We are in an era of renewed dedication to the goal of expanding access to
justice domestically23 and around the world.24 Yet doing so requires that we
define the scope of the issue.25 In this Part, I describe how a growing
international body of evidence regarding the prevalence, distribution, and
consequences of civil legal problems, as well as the most significant barriers to
their resolution, has influenced the evolving definition of access to justice.
A. Justiciable Problems: Prevalence, Distribution, and Consequences
We live in a “law-thick” world26 in which civil legal problems are both
prevalent and consequential.27 While this includes situations involving formal

See, e.g., Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of
Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 101 (noting that research on access to justice is “in the
midst of a renaissance”).
24 Pascoe Pleasence & Nigel J. Balmer, Justice & the Capability to Function in Society, DÆDALUS,
Winter 2019, at 141 (“Global interest in enabling access to justice has never been greater.”);
G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Goal 16.3
(Oct. 21, 2015), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/sustainabledevelopmentgoals
(adopting a goal to “[p]romote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure
equal access to justice for all”).
25 Rebecca Sandefur, Access to What?, DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 49–50 (noting that the
appropriate remedy to the problem of inequalities in access to justice depends on our
understanding of the problem) [hereinafter Sandefur, Access to What?].
26 Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the Legal
Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 133 (2010).
27 See OECD & OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., LEGAL NEEDS SURVEYS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
(2019), https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g9a36c-en; PASCOE PLEASANCE, NIGEL J. BALMER, &
REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, PATHS TO JUSTICE: A PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE ROADMAP (2013).
23
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civil legal action, these represent only a tiny fraction—the tip of the iceberg—
of the civil legal problems that individuals experience.28
Survey research employing the analytic concept of justiciable events or
problems to identify situations that raise non-trivial civil legal issues or have civil
legal consequences, regardless of whether they are perceived as ‘legal’ by those
who experience them,29 finds a much greater incidence of civil legal problems.30
As many as half of all American households are estimated to be experiencing at
least one justiciable problem at any given time,31 and many individuals report
experiencing multiple problems within a given period.32 These problems involve
fundamental needs including housing, employment, finances, and intimate
relationships.33
Justiciable problems are prevalent across all sectors of the population, but
they are more frequent among African Americans and Latinx individuals and
Rebecca L. Sandefur, Paying Down the Civil Justice Data Deficit: Leveraging Existing National
Data Collection, 68 S.C. L. REV. 295, 299 (2016); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances,
Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 525, 546 (1980) (noting
the low rate of litigation relative to the number of grievances); Felstiner at al., supra note 7, at
636.
29 HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO
LAW 12 (1999) (defining a “justiciable event”).
30 OECD & OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., supra note 27, at 33–34; PLEASENCE ET AL., supra note
27, at 27; GENN, supra note 29 at 23; HAZEL GENN & ALAN PATERSON, PATHS TO JUSTICE
SCOTLAND: WHAT PEOPLE IN SCOTLAND DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW 34 (2001);
PASCOE PLEASENCE, NIGEL BALMER, ASH PATEL, ANDREW CLEARY, TOM HUSKINSON, TOBY
COTTON, CIVIL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 8 (2011); NIGEL BALMER, ENGLISH AND
WELSH CIVIL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE PANEL SURVEY: WAVE 2 9 (2012); CHRISTINE
COUMARELOS, DEBORAH MACOURT, JULIE PEOPLE, HUGH M. MCDONALD, ZHIGANG WEI,
REINY IRIANA & STEPHANIE RAMSEY, LEGAL AUSTRALIA-WIDE SURVEY: LEGAL NEED IN
AUSTRALIA 57 (2012); TREVOR C.W. FARROW, AB CURRIE, NICOLE AYLWIN, LES JACOBS,
DAVID NORTHRUP & LISA MOORE, EVERYDAY LEGAL PROBLEMS AND THE COST OF JUSTICE
IN CANADA: OVERVIEW REPORT 6 (2016).
31 Sandefur, supra note 9, at 445 (2016) (noting that “conservative estimates . . . suggest as
many as half of American households are experiencing at least one significant civil justice
situation at any given time”); CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVS. & PUB., AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL
NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS 9 (1994) (reporting that about half of all
households surveyed in a national survey of legal needs had experienced at least one “situation
that raised a legal issue” during the focal period). Earlier surveys using different question
formulations also offer evidence of the prevalence of civil legal problems. See, e.g., BARBARA A.
CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY
100 (1977).
32 REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA: FINDINGS
FROM THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY 7 (2014) (reporting that among those
respondents to a survey of residents of a mid-size Midwestern city who had experienced at least
one justiciable problem within the study’s reference period, the average number of problems
experienced was 3.3) [hereinafter SANDEFUR, CNSS]; CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVS. & PUB.,
supra note 31, at 9.
33 SANDEFUR, CNSS, supra note 32, at 7.
28
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among low-income individuals.34 In addition, the types and number of justiciable
problems that individuals experience are patterned by social and economic
status.35 Clusters of justiciable problems often co-occur, arising from similar
situations or socio-demographic characteristics.36
These problems are associated not only with negative legal and financial
consequences, but also physical, social, and emotional harm.37 The outcomes
achieved vary, with the majority of justiciable problems going unresolved.38
While some individuals are satisfied with their resolutions, at least one study
found that less than half of respondents were able to achieve their main
objectives in responding to a justiciable problem they experienced.39
B. Barriers to Justice
Individuals’ behavior in response to justiciable problems varies.40 Despite
potentially severe consequences, few individuals seek legal assistance to address
justiciable problems and even fewer take formal legal action.41 In contrast,
almost half of individuals attempt to address problems on their own.42 Those
who seek help typically do so from friends or family or from a non-lawyer
advisor.43 Another common but troubling response is to “lump it”44 and do
nothing.45
Id. at 8–9.
PASCOE PLEASENCE, CAUSES OF ACTION: CIVIL LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 18–19 (2d
ed. 2006).
36 Pascoe Pleasance, Nigel J. Balmer, Alexy Buck, Aoife O’Grady & Hazel Genn, Multiple
Justiciable Problems: Common Clusters and Their Social and Demographic Indicators, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L.
STUDS. 301, 314–19 (2004) (identifying clusters of justiciable problems that co-occur and are
more prevalent among certain socio-demographic groups); GENN, supra note 29, at 31–36;
OECD & OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., supra note 27, at 32–33.
37 SANDEFUR, CNSS, supra note 32, at 10.
38 GENN, supra note 29, at 147 fig.5.1.
39 Id. at 196.
40 OECD & OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., supra note 27, at 33–34; Miller & Sarat, supra note 28,
at 548, 552, 555; Felstiner et al., supra note 7, at 639–45; Herbert M. Kritzer, W. A. Bogart &
Neil Vidmar, The Aftermath of Injury: Cultural Factors in Compensation Seeking in Canada and the United
States, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 499, 522 (1991); Leon Mayhew & Albert J. Reiss, Jr., The Social
Organization of Legal Contacts, 34 AM. SOC. REV. 309, 310 (1969).
41 SANDEFUR, CNSS, supra note 32, at 12; Miller & Sarat, supra note 28, at 544; CONSORTIUM
ON LEGAL SERVS. & PUB., supra note 31, at 17–19.
42 SANDEFUR, CNSS, supra note 32, at 12.
43 Id.
44 William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 63, 81 (1974) (defining “lumping it” as a “special form of avoidance” characterized by
“ignoring the dispute, by declining to take any or much action in response”).
45 SANDEFUR, CNSS, supra note 32, at 12 (reporting that 16% of respondents to survey of
mid-sized Midwestern city residents who had experienced a justiciable problem said they did
nothing to respond to the problem); Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing:
34
35
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Several factors help to explain the variation in individuals’ responses.
Problem severity46 and substance,47 for example, are key predictors of
individuals’ responsive behavior. In addition, the ways in which individuals
perceive and characterize the problems they experience help to explain their
behavior in response.48 Individuals are much more likely to characterize their
problems as “bad luck” or “part of God’s plan” than they are to see them as
“legal,” and are much less likely to view lawyers as an appropriate approach to
addressing “non-legal” problems.49
An additional factor50 that helps to explain observed variation in behavior is
individuals’ capacity to take responsive action.51 Deficits in legal capability may
be particularly important in understanding why individuals choose not to
respond to justiciable problems.52
These various factors are interrelated53 and overlaid with socio-demographic
variation.54 This makes the question of why individuals choose to respond to
justiciable problems in the ways that they do complex and challenging to answer.
However, what is clear is that oversimplifications—such as the idea that the cost

Everyday Problems and Responses of Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS
116, 116 (Pascoe Pleasence, Alexy Buck & Nigel J. Balmer eds., 2007).
46 Pascoe Pleasence, Nigel J. Balmer & Stian Reimers, What Really Drives Advice Seeking
Behaviour? Looking Beyond the Subject of Legal Disputes, 1 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES, no. 6, 2011,
at 1, 13, tbl.3; OECD & OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., supra note 27, at 34.
47 SANDEFUR, CNSS, supra note 32, at 11; GENN, supra note 29 at 141 (finding that “problem
type tends to swamp other considerations” in predicting whether individuals seek advice, the
type of advice they seek, and the amount they are willing to pay); Herbert M. Kritzer, To Lawyer
or Not to Lawyer, Is that the Question?, 5 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUDS. 875, 900 (2008) (finding significant
variation in lawyer-use by problem type); Pleasence et al., supra note 46.
48 See, e.g., SANDEFUR, CNSS, supra note 32, at 14; OECD & OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., supra
note 27, at 33–34.
49 SANDEFUR, CNSS, supra note 32, at 14.
50 Arguably, legal capacity incorporates some factors listed separately here. See OECD &
OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., supra note 27, at 34 (noting that “the majority” of a list of factors
predicting behavior “are aspects of legal capability”).
51 Pleasence & Balmer, supra note 24, at 141 (“Legal capability is central to opportunities
and choices about how to handle problems.”).
52 Hugh M. McDonald & Julie People, Legal Capability and Inaction for Legal Problems: Knowledge,
Stress
and
Cost,
UPDATING
JUST.,
June
2014
http://www.lawfoundation.net.au/ljf/site/templates/UpdatingJustice/$file/UJ_41_Legal_cap
ability_and_inaction_for_legal_problems_FINAL.pdf (noting that among a nationally
representative sample of Australians, common explanations for inaction in response to a legal
problem were that the individual “didn’t know what to do,” thought it “would be too stressful,”
and thought it “would cost too much”).
53 See, e.g., Pleasence et al., supra note 46.
54 See, OECD & OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., supra note 27, at 31–32; Pleasence et al., supra note
46.
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of legal services is the singular barrier to invoking law in response to civil legal
problems—are inconsistent with the empirical evidence.55
C. Defining Access to Justice
This emerging empirical understanding of the role of civil law in everyday
life and individuals’ disinclination and inability to respond through legal action
has implications for our understanding of access to justice. At its narrowest,
access to justice has been equated with access to legal counsel in civil litigation.
Driven by the fact that legal representation is associated with more favorable
outcomes56 but a tremendous number of Americans involved in civil actions are
self-represented,57 this approach is embodied by the movement for a right to
government-provided legal representation for indigent litigants,58 a so-called civil
Gideon.59 While proponents of the right to counsel may recognize that not all
situations require the services of a lawyer, the movement prioritizes access to
legal expertise over other means of achieving satisfactory outcomes.60
Empirical work on the incidence of “legal needs” fosters a more expansive
definition of access to justice by focusing on the occurrence of justiciable
problems, regardless of the involvement of legal actors or institutions.61
55 Rebecca L. Sandefur, Bridging the Gap: Rethinking Outreach for Greater Access to Justice, 37 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 721, 721–22 (2015) (recounting, and rejecting, the two common
“money story” explanations for inequalities in access to justice).
56 Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About
When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 39–40 (2010); Rebecca L. Sandefur, The
Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 51, 51–52 (2010);
Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise: Understanding Relational and Substantive
Expertise through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 909, 910 (2015) [hereinafter Sandefur,
Elements].
57 NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. COURTS CIV. JUST. INITIATIVE, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL
LITIGATION
IN
STATE
COURTS
(2015),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/13376/civiljusticereport-2015.pdf; Mark
D. Gough & Emily S. Taylor Poppe, (Un)Changing Rates of Pro Se Litigation in Federal Court, 45 L.
& SOC. INQUIRY 567, 574 (2020) (reporting that, “[b]etween 1999 and 2018, over 1,517,000
federal district court cases, or 28 percent of all cases filed, involved at least one pro se party”).
58 See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, The Right to Civil Counsel, DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 57.
59 The name refers to Gideon v. Wainwright, 72 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the right to
counsel is a constitutionally protected element of due process in criminal cases).
60 See Tonya L. Brito, David J. Pate Jr., Daanika Gordon & Amanda Ward, What We Know
and Need to Know about Civil Gideon, 67 S.C. L. REV. 223, 225 (2016) (noting that, “[w]hile
advocates for Civil Gideon do not claim that an attorney is essential in every case involving an
unrepresented litigant, they place greater emphasis on securing a right to civil counsel than on
increased resources and innovation for self-representation”).
61 See, e.g., CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVS. & PUB., supra note 31, at 8 (1994) (“[P]eople
sometimes find ways of dealing with circumstances they face without turning to a lawyer, a
mediator, or the courts. These circumstances are still considered ‘legal needs’ although there is
no implication they must of necessity be brought to the justice system.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3773280

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE

11

However, the expansiveness of this definition is circumscribed by the
classification of “unmet legal needs” as all justiciable problems that did not
involve legal assistance.62 This approach implicitly assumes that justiciable
problems cannot be satisfactorily resolved without recourse to legal counsel or
formal legal institutions, retaining a law-centric view of access to justice.63
Foundational socio-legal scholarship on dispute processing is similarly
centered on civil litigation as the pinnacle in resolving grievances.64 To be fair,
the goal of this scholarship is to understand the genesis of legal claims,65 making
its focus on that terminus a logical choice. However, the assumed procedural
linearity and the lack of curiosity about alternate pathways reinforce a courtcentric understanding of justiciable problems and a correspondingly narrow
understanding of access to justice.66
Yet the fact that most Americans who face a justiciable problem do not
understand it as a legal problem and are unlikely to use formal law to address it
militate against a court- and lawyer-dominated conceptualization of access to
justice.67 So, too, does our understanding of individuals’ experiences of law in

LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS
LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS
6
(2017),
https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf
(reporting
that, “LSC defines the justice gap as the difference between the civil legal needs of low-income
Americans and the resources available to meet those needs”).
63 Sandefur, supra note 9, at 451 (noting that popular computations of “unmet legal needs”
rely on a gross oversimplification and that “a legal need is a justice problem that a person cannot
handle correctly or successfully without some kind of legal expertise [and that] [n]ot all justice
situations are legal needs in this sense”).
64 Miller & Sarat, supra note 28, at 545 (introducing the concept of the dispute pyramid);
Felstiner et al., supra note 28, at 633–37 (providing an analytic framework to explain the
emergence and transformation of events experienced in life into formal civil legal disputes).
65 See, e.g., Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle
Medical Grievances, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 105, 105 (1990) (“[Because] few disputes . . . become
legally framed and resolved, the lawsuits in medical malpractice studies represent only the tip of
the iceberg. In this research we investigate the shape of the iceberg and analyze what
characterizes the grievances that make their way to the tip visible on the legal docket.”).
66 Not all work on dispute processing can be characterized in this way. See, e.g., Catherine
R. Albiston, Lauren B. Edelman & Joy Milligan, The Dispute Tree and the Legal Forest, 10 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 105, 106, 108 (2014) (characterizing the dispute pyramid as “an inadequate
representation of the broad social processes that resolve justiciable disputes” and proposing the
“dispute tree” in its stead); Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Linda Mulcahy, The Social Psychology of Making
and Responding to Hospital Complaints: An Account Model of Complaint Processes, 6 LAW & POL'Y 123,
133–34 (1994) (focusing on the social dynamics in play in the iterative process of making a
complaint).
67 Sandefur, Access to What?, supra note 25, at 50–51.
62

OF
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everyday life68 and their ability to resolve civil legal problems without recourse
to formal legal institutions.69
Building on these insights, a new iteration in the ongoing evolution of access
to justice is emerging.70 Encapsulating this shift, Professor Rebecca Sandefur
frames access to justice as a problem of inequality, proposing that we will have
achieved access to justice when the probability is the same for all groups in the
population that “disputes and problems governed by civil law” are resolved in
ways that satisfy substantive and procedural legal norms, regardless of the
method of resolution.71 Thus, while advocates for access to justice today
continue to be disturbed by inequalities in the experiences and outcomes of
unrepresented litigants in civil litigation,72 the field is concerned with the much
broader challenge of helping the vast majority of individuals—whose problems
never make their way to a lawyer or legal forum—access justice.73
The rationality of this conceptualization of access to justice—as being
concerned with equality in the outcomes to justiciable problems achieved by
individuals—belies its radicality. The novelty of the approach is particularly
conspicuous with regard to the set of resolution processes that it encapsulates.
68 PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE 45 (1998) (defining legal consciousness).
69 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
70 Earlier generations of scholars also provide examples of calls for renewed, evidencebased understandings of access to justice. See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth & Mauro Cappelletti, Access
to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFFALO L. REV.
181, 182 (1978) (describing the “most recent phase of a long historical struggle—the struggle
for ‘access to justice’”). For analyses of previous transitions in the access to justice movement,
see David M. Trubek, Critical Moments in Access to Justice Theory: The Quest for the Empowered Self,
107 in ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE (Allan C. Hutchinson ed., 1990).
71 Sandefur, Access to What?, supra note 25, at 50–51; see also Rebecca L. Sandefur, Fulcrum
Point of Equal Access to Justice: Legal and Nonlegal Institutions of Remedy, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 949,
951 (2009) (defining “equal access to justice” as meaning “that different groups in a society . . .
have similar chances of obtaining similar resolutions to similar kinds of civil justice problems”)
[hereinafter Sandefur, Fulcrum Point]. On a more theoretical note, one might ask whether it is
possible to achieve access to justice, so defined, without law; if it is legal principles that generate
our definition of just processes and outcomes, non-court process may be understood as a form
of legal pluralism.
72 See, e.g., Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Lawyers, Power, and Strategic
Expertise, 93 DENVER L. REV. 469 (2016); Sandefur, Elements, supra note 56; Victor D.
Quintanilla, Rachel A. Allen & Edward R. Hirt, The Signaling Effect of Pro se Status, 42 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 1091 (2016).
73 OECD & OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., supra note 27, at 24 (“[A]ccess to justice is broadly
concerned with the ability of people to obtain just resolution of justiciable problems and enforce
their rights, in compliance with human rights standards; if necessary, through impartial formal
or informal institutions of justice and with appropriate legal support . . . . In functional terms,
this does not mean that use of legal services is necessary to ensure access to justice, only that
appropriate services are available for those who are unable to achieve otherwise appropriate
solutions to justiciable problems.”) (citations omitted).
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The idea that access to justice involves the universe of non-trivial justiciable
problems is not novel; the legal needs tradition has long shared this precept.
However, unlike the legal needs tradition, which directs its attention to courtand lawyer-based interventions, this definition rejects the idea of a one-size-fitsall response. Instead, this approach includes within the access to justice bailiwick
a much more diverse array of mechanisms through which individuals may
respond to justiciable problems.
In addition, by shifting attention more heavily toward the resolutions
achieved by individuals, as opposed to just their ability to access the legal
process, this definition adopts a more demanding objective. In doing so, it
imposes a greater affirmative duty to engage individuals who lack the capability
or inclination to address justiciable problems on their own. This, in turn,
necessitates consideration of the many overlapping forms of inequality that push
and pull individuals into various approaches and invites greater attention to the
links between justiciable and other social problems.
II. AN ORPHAN ISSUE
In this Part, I evaluate the United States’ capacity to implement this
contemporary conceptualization of access to justice. I begin by identifying the
types of interventions that operationalize this approach, drawing on a series of
international evidence-based best practices. I then describe how our institutional
infrastructure presents a major obstacle to the implementation of these
practices. Finally, I consider the implications of this institutional design problem
for our political imagination and the possibility of reform.
A. Interventions for Access to Justice
Effective policy interventions for access to justice must incorporate an
empirical understanding of individuals’ behaviors in response to justiciable
problems.74 Building on this evidence base, a series of best practices for access
to justice programs are emerging, summarized by Australian scholars and
practitioners as follows: interventions should be targeted, joined-up with other
social services, timely, and appropriate to the capabilities of affected

74 Pleasence & Balmer, supra note 23, at 141 (noting that several decades of empirical
research “have made clear that, to be truly effective, access-to-civil-justice policy must be
grounded in an understanding of the many options people face when dealing with civil legal
problems, of the reality of people’s behavior in resolving problems, and of the reasons for
underlying patterns of options and behaviors”).
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individuals.75 In the sections that follow, I describe each of these best practices
in turn.
1. Targeted Outreach and Interventions
Targeted interventions aim to increase the efficiency and efficacy of access
to justice initiatives by ensuring that assistance is accessible to those groups that
are most in need.76 Particular attention is dedicated to reaching those groups that
are most disadvantaged vis-à-vis the civil legal system because they are both
more likely to experience justiciable problems and less likely to be able to handle
them independently.77 Targeted strategies are proactive, recognizing that “legal
service delivery will fall dramatically short of providing access to justice for all if
it relies on servicing only those clients who make it through the lawyer’s ‘front
door.’”78
Examples of targeted outreach include advertising,79 in-person outreach at
set or traveling locations, and technology-based engagement such as legal aid
hotlines,80 internet chat-based services, or online conferencing.81 In coordination
with these outreach efforts, there is a need for simplified entry points for
accessing legal services, to allow both targeted individuals and the general public
to access assistance and to streamline referrals from other service providers who
serve as “problem noticers.”82 Ideally, these gateways should be visible, easily
accessible, able to triage clients’ issues, and well connected to a range of more
specialized service providers.83
PASCOE PLEASENCE, CHRISTINE COUMARELOS, SUZIE FORELL & HUGH M.
MCDONALD, LAW & JUST. FOUND. OF N.S.W., RESHAPING LEGAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES:
BUILDING
ON
THE
EVIDENCE
BASE
25–29
(2014),
http://www.lawfoundation.net.au/ljf/site/articleIDs/D76E53BB842CB7B1CA257D7B000D
5173/$file/Reshaping_legal_assistance_services_web.pdf [hereinafter PLEASENCE ET AL.,
RESHAPING LEGAL ASSISTANCE]; CHRISTINE COUMARELOS, HUGH M. MCDONALD, SUZIE
FORELL & ZHIGANG WEI, LAW & JUST. FOUND. OF N.S.W., COLLABORATIVE PLANNING
RESOURCE—SERVICE
PLANNING
(2015),
http://www.lawfoundation.net.au/ljf/site/templates/reports/$file/CPR_Service_Planning_N
ov2015.pdf.
76 PLEASENCE ET AL., RESHAPING LEGAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 75, at 31–33.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 32–33.
79 Sandefur, supra note 55, at 734; Elizabeth Chambliss, Marketing Legal Assistance,
DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 100.
80 Emergency services have claimed 911, some localities use 311 for non-emergency city
services, 411 is information, and some phone companies use 611 to report service issues.
Perhaps we should adopt 711 for justice (although that number might leave some users craving
a Slurpee).
81 PLEASENCE ET AL., RESHAPING LEGAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 75, at 37–39.
82 Id. at 33–34.
83 Id. at 33.
75
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There is substantial consistency over time and space in the characteristics of
groups that are likely to benefit from targeted interventions.84 However recent
crises like the global pandemic,85 the Financial Crisis,86 and natural disasters87
have all made it clear that legal needs can evolve over time. Thus, ongoing data
collection and monitoring are also important underlying access to justice
strategies.
2. Joined-Up
Joined-up interventions combine legal and non-legal service providers88 to
better identify and address justiciable problems.89 For example, partnerships
with established local agencies can help to overcome some of the difficulties in
engaging hard-to-reach target groups.90 These partnerships can vary greatly in
their level of integration and form, and optimal arrangements will likely depend
on context and funding and other operational considerations.91
In the United States, medical-legal partnerships are the most established
form of joined-up access to justice intervention.92 Other potential partnerships
include those with libraries and social workers,93 as well as efforts in schools,
OECD & OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., supra note 27, at 32.
See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON LEGAL NEEDS ARISING OUT OF THE 2020 PANDEMIC, AM. BAR
ASS’N, SUMMARY REPORT: SURVEY REGARDING LEGAL NEEDS ARISING FROM THE COVID19
PANDEMIC
(2020),
https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn:aaid:scds:US:4f7c11ac-fc44-428a88a9-6c1b0d101b80#pageNum=1 (reporting results of survey finding a rise in legal needs
regarding unemployment benefits, housing and landlord/tenant issues, issues relating to
government benefits, employment, insurance coverage, guardianship, and family law, among
others).
86 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 402 (2011),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (describing the
dramatic rise in foreclosures during the Financial Crisis).
87 See, e.g., BayLegal, Legal Services for Individuals and Families Impacted by Northern California
Wildfires, BAY AREA LEGAL AID (Oct. 23, 2017), https://baylegal.org/northern-californiawildfire/ (advertising assistance for legal issues arising from wildfires, including housing, public
benefits, consumer, insurance, employment, and missing documents).
88 PLEASENCE ET AL., RESHAPING LEGAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 75, at 70.
89 Id. at 70.
90 Id. at 47.
91 Id. at 70–71.
92 Elizabeth Tobin-Tyler, Medical-Legal Partnership in Primary Care: Moving Upstream in the
Clinic, 13 AM. J. LIFESTYLE MED. 282, 283 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1177/1559827617698417
(noting that medical-legal partnerships are “now rapidly expanding across the country, with
programs in nearly 300 health centers and hospitals in 41 states”); The Response, NAT’L CTR. FOR
MEDICAL-LEGAL P’SHIP, https://medical-legalpartnership.org/response/ (last visited Nov. 25,
2020) (noting that the organization “has helped cultivate programs . . . at 442 hospitals and
health centers across the U.S.”).
93 PLEASENCE ET AL., RESHAPING LEGAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 75, at 87.
84
85

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3773280

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE

16

churches, or other community organizations.94 Barbershops and hair salons have
also been noted as possible sites for legal outreach efforts, particularly for
outreach to the African American community.95 The potential for this approach
is bolstered by the success of similar partnerships with medical providers.96
3. Timely
Timely, or early, interventions aim to resolve justiciable problems before
they escalate.97 Examples of early access to justice interventions range from
education, legal capability building, and more general information distribution
to supported information provision, advice, and dispute resolution services.98
These kinds of interventions have the potential to be an efficient use of legal
service resources because they can help to avoid the need for more intensive—
and more costly—interventions later.99 They can also help to expand the reach
of legal services by assisting more people with a more diverse range of legal
needs, although with the tradeoff of pulling limited resources away from the
most essential legal needs or most disadvantaged populations.100
This type of approach could help to address the dearth of transactional and
advisory legal services for the general public. Professor Gillian Hadfield has
highlighted the failures of the legal services market in this area, noting the sharp
contrast to the extensive “before-the-fact” advice that corporate clients regularly
receive from their lawyers.101 She notes that the absence of such services can set
individuals on a trajectory toward legal crises that are the primary focus of many
access to justice interventions.102

94 Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1263, 1316
(2016).
95 Tanina Rostain, Techno-Optimism & Access to the Legal System, DÆdalus, Winter 2019, at 95.
96 Ronald G. Victor, Kathleen Lynch, Ning Li, Ciantel Blyler, Eric Muhammad, Joel
Handler, Jeffrey Brettler, Mohamad Rashid, Brent Hsu, Davontae Foxx-Drew, Norma Moy,
Anthony E. Reid & Robert M. Elashoff, A Cluster-Randomized Trial of Blood-Pressure Reduction in
Black Barbershops, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1291, 1291 (2018), DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1717250
(reporting results of a study comparing hypertension outcomes among black male patrons of
barbershops that were randomly assigned to either a pharmacist-led intervention [treatment] or
a barber-led intervention [control] that found reductions in average systolic blood pressure
among participants in both groups, but a statistically-significantly greater reduction among
participants in the treatment group).
97 PLEASENCE ET AL., RESHAPING LEGAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 75, at 101.
98 Id. at 102.
99 Id. at 102–03.
100 Id. at 103–04.
101 Hadfield, supra note 26, at 132 (noting that “for ordinary citizens in the U.S. there is
almost no functioning legal system in this ex ante sphere”).
102 See id. at 131–32.
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4. Appropriate
Finally, access to justice interventions must be appropriate to the needs and
abilities of their intended audience.103 Interventions will be ineffective if the
parties they reach cannot deploy them,104 a problem that is particularly acute for
many common types of self-help interventions.105 Building on the expansive
body of empirical evidence documenting persistent inequalities in individuals’
behavior in response to justiciable problems and their explanations for actions
taken, a growing body of research seeks to develop our understanding of legal
capability.106
A multidimensional construct,107 legal capability seeks to capture the skills,
attitudes, and beliefs that affect individuals’ ability to resolve justiciable
problems.108 Researchers have developed approaches to measuring several
constituent elements of legal capability including legal confidence109 and
attitudes toward the civil legal system.110 Future work is likely to develop
additional measures and to deepen our understanding of the role of legal
capability.111
The importance of developing interventions that are consistent with the
legal capability and circumstances of their intended audience is increasingly
recognized in the context of technological approaches to increasing access to
103 PLEASENCE ET AL., RESHAPING LEGAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 75, at 122; D. James
Greiner, Dalié Jiménez & Lois R. Lupica, Self-Help Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119, 1124 (2017).
104 Greiner et al., supra note 103, at 1124; Catrina Denvir, Online and in the Know? Public Legal
Education, Young People, and the Internet, 92–93 COMPUTS. & EDUC. 204, 211 (2016),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compedu.2015.10.003.
105 PLEASENCE ET AL., RESHAPING LEGAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 75, at 122 (noting that,
“websites, hotlines, public legal education and information, self-help tools and other forms of
unbundled legal services” may be “ill-suited and ill-matched to the legal needs and capabilities
of some groups”).
106 See, e.g., id. at 122. A related, but somewhat theoretically distinct formulation focuses on
legal consciousness as a form of cultural capital. Kathryne M. Young & Katie R. Billings, Legal
Consciousness and Cultural Capital, 54 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 33, 35 (2020) (drawing on a
“Bourdieusian framework . . . to think about legal consciousness as a social process and to
explain continued inequality within legal systems”).
107 PLEASENCE ET AL., RESHAPING LEGAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 75, at 130–33.
108 Pascoe Pleasence & Nigel Balmer, Development of a General Legal Confidence Scale: A First
Implementation of the Rasch Measurement Model in Empirical Legal Studies, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDS. 143, 144 (2019) (noting that specifications of legal capability have incorporated
“knowledge of law, the ability to spot legal issues, awareness of legal services, understanding of
and the ability to assess dispute resolution options, planning and management skills,
communication skills, confidence and emotional fortitude”).
109 Id. at 153 (presenting the General Legal Confidence Scale).
110 Pascoe Pleasence & Nigel Balmer, Measuring the Accessibility and Equality of Civil Justice, 10
HAGUE J. RULE L. 255, 276, 280 (2018) (presenting an “Inaccessibility of Justice Scale” and a
“Perceived Inequality of Justice” scale).
111 PLEASENCE ET AL., RESHAPING LEGAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 75, at 122.
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justice.112 Some of these concerns are specific to that context, such as inequalities
in internet access and digital literacy.113 However, many are equally applicable to
other kinds of access to justice interventions.114 There remains much to be done
to integrate these insights into other forms of access to justice outreach.115
Thus, building on a broad base of empirical evidence, scholars and
practitioners advocate for the adoption of access to justice interventions that are
proactive, customized, and nested within a broader network of social services,
undergirded by rigorous evaluation and ongoing data collection. In the next Part,
I describe how institutional design severely limits our ability to implement these
types of interventions in the United States.
B. Institutional Responsibility for Access to Justice
In some countries, multiple legal and nonlegal formal institutions, along with
a broad set of auxiliaries, share overlapping responsibility for addressing
justiciable problems.116 In the United States, by contrast, the options are much
more limited. As Professor Rebecca Sandefur writes, “If Americans do not go
to law, they face relatively few alternative means of remedy.”117 As I will describe,
this has profound implications for our ability to act on the emerging
understanding of access to justice.

See, e.g., Rostain, supra note 95, at 94 (cautioning against overoptimistic expectations for
technological solutions to inequalities in access to justice); CATRINA DENVIR, ASSISTED
DIGITAL SUPPORT FOR CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM USERS: DEMAND, DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION (2018), https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/cjcreport-on-assisted-digital-support.pdf (offering empirical evidence of the need for greater
assistance to enable individuals to use online justice services); Margaret Hagan, The User
Experience of the Internet as a Legal Help Service: Defining Standards for the Next Generation of UserFriendly Online Legal Services, 20 VA. J. L. & TECH. 394, 401 (2016); REBECCA L. SANDEFUR,
LEGAL TECH FOR NON-LAWYERS: REPORT OF THE SURVEY OF US LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES 3
(2019)
[hereinafter,
SANDEFUR,
LEGAL
TECH],
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/report_us_digital_legal_te
ch_for_nonlawyers.pdf (“Using many tools requires resources or capabilities that some groups
and communities are unlikely to have.”).
113 Rostain, supra note 95, at 93 (noting limited access to broadband Internet and data caps
on cell phone plans that restrict access to online resources); SANDEFUR, LEGAL TECH, supra
note 112, at 12.
114 Rostain, supra note 95, at 94 (noting that many of the limitations of self-help technologies
“apply equally to most other technologies created in recent years to bridge the justice divide”).
115 See, e.g., Greiner et al., supra note 104, at 1122 (noting that, “there has been little analysis
of, and no rigorous testing of, self-help materials in the legal context” despite their prominent
role among access to justice interventions).
116 Sandefur, Fulcrum Point, supra note 71, at 957–62.
117 Id. at 966.
112
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Effective institutional design requires the appropriate allocation of both
substantive and functional authority.118 That is, institutions must be vested with
responsibility for carrying out the multiple functions necessary to address a given
substantive issue. These functions include, among others, funding; research,
data collection, and monitoring; data compilation and dissemination; data
analysis; planning; standard setting; and implementation.119 The goal is to assign
these underlying functions to institutions with substantive jurisdiction and
functional capacity in ways that enhance the delivery of high-level objectives.
In the case of access to justice, one primary high-level objective is
providing authoritative resolutions to justiciable problems. While there is
increasingly a “private legal order” created by organizations to address disputes
in alternative dispute processing fora,120 public formal institutions of remedy are
limited to the civil justice system and administrative agencies.121
However, it is not only the limited number of institutions that can address
justiciable problems that has implications for access to justice, but their
substantive and functional jurisdiction. The civil justice system bears
responsibility for promoting equity only in those situations in which justiciable
problems give rise to formal legal claims; courts are reactive institutions122
limited to resolving the cases and controversies that appear before them.123
Similarly, administrative agencies are empowered to formally resolve justiciable
problems that fall within their domain,124 but do not bear responsibility for
inequalities beyond those boundaries.125 Thus, while our formal institutions of
remedy increasingly include options for alternative forms of dispute resolution

118 ALEJANDRO E. CAMACHO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT:
A FUNCTIONAL AND DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK 21 (2019). While this work is focused
exclusively on the allocation of authority among government entities, the analytic framework
can logically be extended to incorporate private entities.
119 Id. at 26–28.
120 Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court: Speculations on the
Organizational Internationalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 941, 943, 953 (1999).
121 Sandefur, Fulcrum Point, supra note 71, at 957–62.
122 Frances Kahn Zemans, Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the Political System,
77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 690, 691 (1983).
123 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
particular cases and controversies).
124 Id.
125 This is not to suggest that there is not more that administrative agencies could do to
promote equality in access to justice. For example, agencies could reduce administrative burdens,
including the “learning, psychological, and compliance costs that citizens experience in their
interactions with government.” PAMELA HERD & DONALD P. MOYNIHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE
BURDEN: POLICYMAKING BY OTHER MEANS 22 (2018). These burdens are not inevitable but
constructed. See id. at 259. Left unaddressed, they can give rise to justiciable problems. See, e.g.,
SANDEFUR, CNSS, supra note 32, at 7 (finding that 16% of respondents in a mid-size Midwestern
city reported experiencing at least one situation involving government benefits).
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and engage in efforts to assist individuals within the adjudicatory process,126 their
mandates prevent them from addressing the bulk of justiciable problems, which
remain outside their reach.
Importantly, this is a problem of institutional design,127 not simply resource
allocation. For example, even if a massive influx of funding provided highquality legal representation to every litigant who appeared at every state and
federal courthouse or before every administrative agency, it would ignore the
vast majority of individuals who never identify their justiciable problems as
“legal” and never seek formal adjudication.
Moreover, it is not just that these institutions fail to provide authoritative
resolutions to the majority of justiciable problems, they also fail to carry out the
other underlying functions that are necessary to address the social problem of
inequalities in access to justice. Developing and delivering effective access to
justice interventions requires data collection and analysis regarding the incidence
of justiciable problems, program evaluation to assess the efficacy of
interventions, planning to coordinate interventions that span functional or
substantive boundaries, and funding to direct resources where they are most
needed. While other institutions may help to address some of these gaps,128 the
current matrix of substantive and functional jurisdiction of institutions leaves
many functions essential to enhancing access to justice unaddressed129 and no
single institution bears responsibility for resolving this or for the issue writ large.
As a result, access to justice as contemporarily understood is largely an orphan
issue, a problem for which no institution bears responsibility.
See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES
(2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/centerforinnovation/odrvisualizatio
nreport.pdf; REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON SMYTHE, ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST
REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT 14 (2011) (describing
the prevalence of self-help centers in courthouses).
127 To be clear, the focus of my institutional analysis is understanding the extent to which
existing institutions are responsible for addressing access to justice as a social issue. This is in
contrast to the central focus of the literature on dispute system design, which considers how
institutions that are responsible for dispute resolution can be designed to optimize various
outcomes. See, e.g., Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems
Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123 (2009).
128 For example, legal information is disseminated on the Internet by a variety of sources
beyond just the court system. Denvir, supra note 104, at 204 (“The Internet offers a platform for
the exchange of information, much of which is freely given by a range of stakeholders, including:
charitable organisations and/or government departments who have as their mission to improve
access to justice; commercial enterprises who can often raise profile through providing a small
amount of content or who can raise revenue by charging to access content; and users themselves
who can provide information gathered by way of experience, expertise or interest in a topic.”).
129 See, e.g, Sandefur & Smythe, supra note 126 at 22 (“One characteristically Americanstyle aspect of U.S. access to justice is the absence of any central entity that either researches
or directs the provision of civil legal assistance.”).
126
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C. Implications of Institutional Design
This lack of institutional responsibility for all necessary aspects of access to
justice not only has negative consequences for the resolution of individual
justiciable problems, but also follow-on implications for broader structures of
inequality and efforts to enact change.130 As recent events have tragically
illustrated, leadership and accountability are essential in addressing social
crises.131 Without better institutional design, it is unlikely that the problem of
inequalities in access to justice will be understood or addressed systemically.132
This not only constrains individual services, but also hinders the development
of innovations that could expand access to justice.133
It also has negative ramifications for the potential for systemic reform.
Politics create policies, but policies also create politics.134 As individuals respond
to justiciable problems without recourse to formal institutions of remedy, their
experiences reinforce the limited role of these institutions in addressing such
problems. For example, perceptions of legality are believed to be, in part, a
function of the availability of legal services to address the problem.135 In this
way, institutional failures create a negatively reinforcing loop: because existing
social institutions fail to address many justiciable problems, institutions of
remedy are not perceived as appropriate mechanisms for addressing such
problems. Individuals’ political imagination is thus constrained, and the
responsibility of our institutions of remedy with regard to access to justice fails
to become politicized.136
130 See, Lincoln Caplan, The Invisible Justice Problem, DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 28 (noting
that access to justice has been “invisible” and calling for its politicization).
131 Michael D. Shear, Noah Weiland, Eric Lipton, Maggie Haberman & David E. Sanger,
Inside Trump’s Failure: The Rush to Abandon Leadership Role on the Virus, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/18/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-response-failureleadership.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage (characterizing
the Trump Administration’s approach of divesting itself of responsibility for the coronavirus
pandemic as “a catastrophic policy blunder”).
132 PLEASENCE ET AL., RESHAPING LEGAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 75, at v (noting how
structural design factors can limit the ability to develop and implement access to justice services
to meet the needs of a particular group or individual).
133 See, e.g., SANDEFUR, LEGAL TECH, supra note 112.
134 Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change, 45 WORLD
POLS. 595, 596 (1993).
135 Pleasence et al., supra note 46, at 5.
136 Some have suggested that the opposite situation, in which greater access to assistance in
addressing justiciable problems leads to greater use of services, will increase individuals’
likelihood of perceiving problems as requiring assistance; that is, that an increase in supply will
increase demand even if underlying problem rates remain stable. See, Frances Kahn Zemans,
Framework for Analysis of Legal Mobilization: A Decision-Making Model, 1982 AM. BAR FOUND. RES.
J. 989, 990 (predicting that “changes in the delivery system will change demand—that is, if legal
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Yet, at the same time, policies and arguments rejected as “off the wall” in
one era may be embraced in another,137 and the current moment may offer an
opportunity for reform. The contours of the 2020 presidential race indicate the
appetite—at least among a portion of Americans—for a progressive policy
agenda.138 The combination of the pandemic, structural racism, economic
inequality, and an ongoing reckoning with sexual violence and gender inequality
has raised awareness of national failures that may be a “necessary prelude to
fixing our country.”139 As calls for de-funding the police illustrate, shifting public
understanding of social issues can generate support for institutional reform.140
Perhaps it is time to capitalize on this moment in favor of institutional change
for access to justice.
III. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Recognizing that achieving equality in access to justice is a matter of
institutional design,141 this Part proposes a series of institutional reforms. This
includes amending the mandates of existing institutions—changing their
substantive or functional jurisdiction—and establishing new ones to address
needs not captured within the current institutional ecosystem. To be clear, my
claim is not the originality of these prescriptions, many of which have been
espoused by others at various times.142 Rather, the contribution of this Article is
services are made cheaper and more available, there will be greater demand whatever the
‘need’”).
137 Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream,
THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/fromoff-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/;
J.M.
Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith – Part I, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703
(1997).
138 Editorial Board, The Democrats’ Best Choices for President, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/19/opinion/amy-klobuchar-elizabethwarren-nytimes-endorsement.html ( “Nearly any of [of the Democratic candidates for President]
would be the most progressive president in decades on issues like health care, the economy and
government’s allocations of resources.”).
139 See, e.g, Nicholas Kristof, We Interrupt This Gloom to Offer . . . Hope?, N.Y. TIMES (July 16,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/16/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-blm-americahope.html.
140 See Giovanni Russonello, Have Americans Warmed to Calls to ‘Defund the Police’?, N.Y. TIMES
(July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/us/politics/polling-defund-thepolice.html.
141 See infra Section II.C.; see also Sandefur, Fulcrum Point, supra note 71, at 976–77 (“The
fulcrum point in equalizing access to justice is institutional design.”).
142 See, e.g., Danielle Root & Maggie Jo Buchanan, 5 Principles for Civil Justice Reform, CTR. FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(Dec.
19,
2019),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/news/2019/12/19/478875/5-principlescivil-justice-reform/; sources cited infra note 180.
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to situate these recommendations within the larger context of our evolving
understanding of access to justice and, by joining them together, to propose a
more complete policy response.
A. The Office for Access to Justice, 2.0
As described above, enhancing access to justice is a multifaceted endeavor,
but many essential elements fall outside the purview of existing institutions. To
ensure that all necessary aspects are addressed, there is a need for a central,
organizing force with a mandate broad enough to fully encompass the
contemporary conceptualization of access to justice. The Office for Access to
Justice (ATJ) in the Department of Justice, if reconstituted under a future
administration, could serve this role.
Established during the Obama Administration, the ATJ’s mission was
to help the justice system efficiently deliver outcomes that are fair and
accessible to all, irrespective of wealth and status. ATJ staff work[]
within the Department of Justice, across federal agencies, and with
state, local, and tribal justice system stakeholders to increase access to
counsel and legal assistance and to improve the justice delivery systems
that serve people who are unable to afford lawyers.143
While this court-centric mandate might appear too limiting, further description
of the ATJ’s actions reveal a more comprehensive approach. To further its
mission, ATJ sought to “[a]dvance new statutory, policy, and practice changes,”
“[p]romote less lawyer-intensive and court-intensive solutions to legal
problems,” and “[e]xpand research on innovative strategies.”144
This type of institutional support for addressing the issue of access to justice
could be transformational. During its short tenure, ATJ staff filed amicus briefs,
launched an interagency roundtable focused on civil legal aid, and served on the
U.S. Delegation to the United Nations, among other activities.145 A revitalized
ATJ could build upon these efforts by setting a national agenda for access to
justice issues, serving as a liaison to other institutions, facilitating data-collection
efforts, and developing evidence-based policies and practices. Employment
prospects and heightened visibility could also help to entice talented individuals
to the field.
Office for Access to Justice, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ARCHIVES,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atj (last visited July 19, 2020).
144 Office for Access to Justice, About the Office, U.S DEP’T OF JUST. ARCHIVES,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atj/about-office (last updated Oct. 24, 2018).
145 Office for Access to Justice, Accomplishments, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ARCHIVES,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atj/accomplishments (last updated Oct. 24, 2018).
143

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3773280

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE

24

Of course, as with any institution, the level of material support will impact
its effectiveness. By withdrawing material support, the ATJ was effectively
terminated by the Trump Administration.146 Even when the ATJ was still
operating, its reach was reportedly curtailed by the size and composition of its
staff.147 Yet these problems are not unique to the ATJ.148 The most obvious
parallel is the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, which represented a
breakthrough in government responsiveness to consumer problems driven by
an increased understanding of these issues as topics meriting government
action.149 It, too, suffered under the Trump administration,150 as did many other
components of the administrative state.151
Another possible challenge is the decision to site the office within the
Department of Justice. Echoing many of the issues raised by Professor Irene
Oriseweyinmi Joe in her analysis of public defender agencies—housed variously
in executive and judicial branches—it is not immediately clear where a
governmental office dedicated to access to justice should be located.152 If housed
within the judiciary, there is a danger that the agency could skew too heavily
toward a more limited and court-centric view of the issue. If the agency is
housed in the executive branch, it may be less independent and more heavily
influenced by political fluctuations. While valid, these concerns are most

146 Katie Benner, Justice Dept. Office to Make Legal Aid More Accessible Is Quietly Closed, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/us/politics/office-of-access-tojustice-department-closed.html?searchResultPosition=1 (noting that Trump-appointed
Attorney General Jeff Sessions “effectively shuttered” the office by “moving its resources
elsewhere”).
147 Id. (noting that the office “never gained much visibility within the Justice Department
because it did not oversee a large staff of prosecutors”).
148 Similarly the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau emerged as a response to increased
understanding of consumer issues as topics of public concern, and was gutted by the current
administration.
149 See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Product Safety Regulation as a Model for Financial Services Regulation,
42 J. CONSUMER AFFS. 452, 458 (2008).
150 See, e.g., Emily Stewart, Mick Mulvaney Changed the CFPB’s Sign to BCFP, VOX (June 11,
2018) https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/6/11/17451292/mick-mulvaney-cfpbbcfp; Adam Liptak & Alan Rappeport, Supreme Court Lifts Limits on Trump’s Power to Fire Consumer
Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/us/cfpbsupreme- court.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage (noting that
the Supreme Court’s decision to allow the removal of the head of the agency “could . . . open it
to greater politicization, effectively turning its director into something akin to a cabinet member
who serves at the pleasure of a president”).
151 See Kathy Wagner Hill, The State of the Administrative State: The Regulatory Impact of the Trump
Administration, 6 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 25, 26 (2019).
152 See Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Structuring the Public Defender, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 5) (available at https://law.ucdavis.edu/faculty/joe/files/Structuring-thePublic-Defender.pdf) (noting that “[e]ach assignment decision provides both benefits and
handicaps . . . .”).
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relevant in situations where the architecture of an entity is entirely up for debate;
here, there are benefits of building on the existing precedent for ATJ.
B. Bureau of Justice Statistics
As a foundational matter, developing effective access to justice interventions
requires an empirical understanding of existing and emerging legal needs and
their distribution throughout the population.153 While court records could be a
helpful source of information, their usefulness is curtailed by their bias; they
reveal information only about those who seek formal legal remedy. Alternative
data sources are needed to generate a more comprehensive picture, requiring
investment in our woefully underdeveloped knowledge infrastructure.154
The substantive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) could
be amended to include such data collection among its duties. Part of the Office
of Justice Programs within the Department of Justice, the mission of the BJS is
“[t]o collect, analyze, publish, and disseminate information on crime, criminal
offenders, victims of crime, and the operation of the justice systems at all levels
of government. These data are critical to federal, state, and local policymakers
in combating crime and ensuring that justice is both efficient and
evenhanded.”155
While BJS has periodically collected data on civil cases,156 it has not
undertaken analysis of the incidence or distribution of civil legal problems
parallel to its work on crime victimization. Such regular, repeated survey data on
the experience of justiciable problems would greatly enhance our understanding
of the most prevalent and consequential problem types. Data collection and
analysis surrounding the mechanisms of advice- and information-seeking for
particular problems would also be beneficial. Moreover, the BJS might also
investigate attitudes toward the civil legal system, important information that is
also currently lacking.157 Similar surveys in other countries have made significant
See supra Part II.A.
Rebecca L. Sandefur, Paying Down the Civil Justice Data Deficit: Leveraging Existing National
Data Collection, 68 S.C. L. REV. 295, 295 (2016) (describing the dearth of existing data on civil
justice).
155
About the Bureau of Justice Statistics, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS.
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=abu (last visited July 19, 2020).
156 Civil Cases, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=45
(last visited July 19, 2020).
157 The General Social Surveys (GSS) have periodically included questions about Americans’
confidence in various courts. See, e.g., TOM W. SMITH & JAESOK SON, GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY
2012 FINAL REPORT: TRENDS IN PUBLIC ATTITUDES ABOUT CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS
(2013),
https://www.norc.org/PDFs/GSS%20Reports/Trends%20in%20Confidence%20Institutions
_Final.pdf. However, the GSS do not include questions about the experience of justiciable
153
154
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contributions to policy development.158 Broadening the mandate of the BJS to
incorporate these tasks could offer similar benefits. Given the overlap between
criminal and civil legal matters,159 this work might even be seen as enhancing the
existing mandate of the BJS.
C. Courts
As the central institution of remedy for civil legal problems, the civil justice
system will always occupy a central role in addressing inequalities in access to
justice. While revising its substantive mandate to encompass a more holistic
understanding of access to justice—one that encompasses problems that remain
outside of the court system—could dramatically alter the institutional landscape
for access to justice, this seems unlikely. Yet, a more feasible tweak to its existing
functional mandate could also support access to justice.160
Contained within the millions of pages of records courts process and retain
each year is an incredible amount of information. Certainly, it reveals truths
about the civil legal process.161 However, data contained within public court
records also reveals patterns in the incidence of justiciable problems,162 which

problems of use of the civil legal system. Combining questions on these topics into a single
survey would enable analysis investigating links between these attitudes and behavior.
158 OECD/OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS, supra note 27, at 33–34; PLEASENCE, BALMER
& SANDEFUR, supra note 27.
159 See, e.g., Sternberg Greene, supra note 94, at 1289–1290.
160 In addition to the data collection described, by embracing evidence-based interventions
in self-help resources and the provision of legal assistance within court settings, court systems
on both the state and federal level could enhance their access to justice efforts; as a matter of
institutional design, however, it is difficult to know how to encourage such an effort.
161 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 120–121 (2002) (synthesizing empirical data regarding multiple phases of litigation);
Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1920–1921 (2009)
(providing empirical observations on the six phases of litigation); Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L.
Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination
Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 187 (2010)
(examining the trajectories of employment discrimination claims filed in federal court); Marc
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts,
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 464 (2004) (identifying the declining trend in trials).
162 See, e.g., Emily S. Taylor Poppe, Why Consumer Defendants Lump It, 14 NW. J. L. & SOC.
POL’Y 149, 169 (2019) (mapping the locations of individuals facing foreclosure in New York
City using information from property records and court filings); Matthew Hall, Kyle Crowder
& Amy Spring, Neighborhood Foreclosures, Racial/Ethnic Transitions, and Racial Segregation, 80 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 526, 531 (2015) (estimating the impact of foreclosures on residential segregation
by geocoding foreclosures using information drawn from property records); Jacob S. Rugh &
Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOCIO. REV. 629,
635 (2010) (finding that subprime mortgage lending and foreclosures were disproportionately
concentrated in segregated black neighborhoods using data drawn from property records).
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could help to develop targeted interventions. It might also offer additional
benefits.163
Yet, these records are often not stored in accessible formats, curtailing their
usefulness.164 As a result, we have limited information about what occurs within
formal legal actions,165 and even less about other aspects of justiciable problems
that might be gleaned from them. Although there are exceptions,166 much of the
usable data comes from for-profit private companies that compile the records,
extract relevant information, transform it into usable data, and then sell it at a
profit.167 With investments in infrastructure that are long overdue, the massive
For example, by analyzing big data on the distribution of decedents’ estates, some have
suggested that the courts might be able to distribute estates based on probabilistic guesses about
individuals’ dispositive preferences. Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default
Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1419 (2014). At the very least, this
information could guide the development of more accurate default rules. In other situations, the
civil justice system might be able to provide pre-filled forms that reduce the burdens of access.
164 See, e.g., Methods, EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/methods/#how-collected (last
visited Nov. 28,2020) (describing the process used to collect data on evictions: “First, we
requested a bulk report of cases directly from courts. These reports included all recorded
information related to eviction-related cases. Second, we conducted automated record collection
from online portals, via web scraping and text parsing protocols. Third, we partnered with
companies that carry out manual collection of records, going directly into the courts and
extracting the relevant case information by hand.”). In contrast, the availability of court records
relating to criminal matters presents different challenges. See SARAH ESTHER LAGESON,
DIGITAL PUNISHMENT: PRIVACY, STIGMA, AND THE HARMS OF DATA-DRIVEN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (2020); Kathryne M. Young & Joan Petersilia, Keeping Track: Surveillance, Control, and the
Expansion of the Carceral State, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1322 (2016) (drawing on a review of
socio-legal books to highlight the “far-reaching” nature of informal criminal justice control
resulting, in part, from the use of expansive data on the identities of individuals who have had
encounters with the criminal justice system).
165 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 51, 60 (2010) (noting that “[n]ational statistics regarding selfrepresentation do not exist” for matters handled in state courts).
166
See
Caselaw
Access
Project,
LIBRARY
INNOVATION
LAB
(2020),
https://lil.law.harvard.edu/projects/caselaw-access-project/ (describing a Harvard Law School
Library-based initiative that has “digitized over 40 million pages of U.S. court decisions”).
167 See, e.g., REALTYTRAC, https://www.realtytrac.com/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2020) (selling
a subscription service to access their inventory of foreclosures, foreclosed homes for sale,
auctions, and bank-owned homes); see also Eviction Lab, Methods FAQ,
https://evictionlab.org/methods/#data-source (last visited Nov. 25, 2020) (“[M]any states
either did not centralize their eviction data or were unwilling to release this information.
Accordingly, the Eviction Lab then purchased more comprehensive datasets of public eviction
records from two companies: LexisNexis Risk Solutions and American Information Research
Services Inc.”). Similarly, data on members of the legal profession maintained by public entities
is accessible primarily through private intermediaries. See, e.g., Adam Bonica, Adam S. Chilton &
Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of American Lawyers, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 277, 387–88 (2015)
(explaining the author’s reliance on the Martindale-Hubbel Law Directory by noting that,
“although many states keep good records of individuals who are licensed to practice law in their
state, no such national databases exist”).
163
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amount of data maintained by the court system could instead be processed inhouse and harnessed to enhance justice delivery.
However, apart from its usefulness in enhancing the efficient operation of
the courts, the current mandate of the civil justice system offers little incentive
to take on these types of activities. Injecting into the mandates of the
administrative offices of courts a greater emphasis on data collection could
further access to justice efforts. Finally, it is also important to note that courts
could benefit from many of the other institutional reforms proposed. For
example, evaluations of self-help interventions and empirical analysis of
emerging trends in justiciable problem incidence could enhance the efficacy of
court-based access to justice interventions and changes in the regulation of the
legal profession could open new possibilities for assisting litigants.
D. Legal Services Corporation
Ameliorating inequalities in access to justice beyond the confines of the
court system also requires adapting the mandate of the Legal Services
Corporation (LSC). Although hampered by funding cuts,168 LSC remains the
primary source of financial support for legal aid in America.169 In some states, it
is the only source of legal aid funding.170 Despite its key role, LSC continues to
face challenges to its survival.171
The mandate LSC espouses is deeply scared by this struggle. Although it was
established as part of a wave of anti-poverty efforts,172 ongoing opposition and
restrictions on LSC’s activities pushed it toward a direct-service model.173 This
approach hinders LSC’s ability to address issues systemically,174 leading to calls

ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 6–7 (2013)
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/712951/Securing-EqualJustice-for-All-2013-Revision%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; James J. Sandman, The
Role of the Legal Services Corporation in Improving Access to Justice, DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 113
(noting that legal aid is “badly underfunded”).
169 About LSC, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www.lsc.gov/about-lsc (last visited Nov. 25,
2020) (“LSC is the single largest funder of civil legal aid for low-income Americans in the
nation.”).
170 Sandman, supra note 168, at 113.
171 Dorothy Samuels, Trump Targets the Legal Services Corporation, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 11,
2017), https://prospect.org/justice/trump-targets-legal-services-corporation/ (discussing
Trump’s budget proposal calling for defunding of LSC).
172 HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 168, at 12–13; Legal Services Corporation Act, Pub. L.
93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2012)).
173 HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 168, at 34.
174 Sameer Ashar & Annie Lai, Access to Power, DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 83.
168
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for the adoption of community-based services.175 While any shift away from the
provision of individual legal services may seem to undermine the potential to
realize the contemporary conceptualization of access to justice, deeper
consideration reveals the compatibility between these movements. For example,
both approaches build on similar insights about individuals’ engagement—or
lack thereof—with the legal system.176 In addition, community-based legal
services programs seek to empower communities to address issues,177 offering
alternative mechanisms for the resolution of justiciable problems. They also
result in better alignment between legal services and the needs of the
community.178
Thus, although direct services to individuals are a fundamental tool in the
access to justice arsenal, there are ways in which other forms of legal services
could better promote equality in access to justice. Adapting the mandate of the
LSC to encompass these efforts could help to operationalize the contemporary
conceptualization of access to justice.
E. The Legal Profession
The mandate of the legal profession, as reflected in the regulations that
govern it, must also be amended to further equality in access to justice. While
many justiciable problems do not require formal legal advice or representation
for their resolution, others do. We rely on a combination of the private market
for legal services, legal aid, and pro bono to meet this need for in-person legal
services, but the supply remains insufficient.179 For that reason, equalizing access
to civil justice requires that we consider non-lawyer service-providers and better
equip individuals to address their justiciable problems. For this to occur, the

175 Id.; Raymond H. Brescia, Robin Golden & Robert A. Solomon, Who’s in Charge Anyway?
A Proposal for Community-Based Legal Services, 25 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 831, 840 (1997) (criticizing
the direct-services legal aid model and advocating for a shift to community-based legal services).
176 See, e.g., id. at 841 (noting the fragility of the direct services model, stating, “[i]f the
breadth or quality of the legal problem does not lend itself to individual client representation, or
clients fail to present their problems to legal services offices in a timely manner, or staff is
unavailable or unwilling or incapable of addressing the problem, then the services actually
available to clients lose their significance”).
177 Ashar & Lai, supra note 174, at 84; see also, Brescia et al., supra note 175, at 845 (noting
that legal aid that is dislocated from the community, by contrast, “creates a lawyer-driven system
that often results in fewer clients served ultimately, both because of the narrowing of the subject
matter of the representation and the breakdown of lines of communication between legal
services programs and low-income communities”).
178 Brescia et al., supra note 175, at 856–857.
179 Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and American-Style Civil Legal Assistance 41
LAW & SOC’Y REV 79, 80 (2007).
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legal profession must relinquish its monopoly over the provision of legal
services.180
This topic has been discussed extensively elsewhere,181 so I will not address
it in depth here. However, it does raise an interesting institutional design
question: To what extent will the legal profession alienate alternative forms of
legal services providers, as opposed to incorporating them within an expanded
conception of the bar? The structural arrangements through which such nonlawyer legal service providers are educated and credentialed,182 the ways in which
they are embedded or excluded from traditional firms and legal aid
organizations,183 and the degree to which they share with lawyers an obligation
to expand access to law184 could all have implications for access to justice in the
future. Let us hope that they will be structured in ways that promote equality in
access to justice rather than perpetuate existing inequities.
F. Academic Field
Finally, the need for institutional design that supports access to justice
extends to the academic sphere. Several scholars are helping to lead the
movement toward a more expansive and less lawyer-centric understanding of
access to justice. Institutional design could assist in the development of an
intellectual field that builds upon, and furthers, this understanding.
There is much that law schools,185 grant-making institutions, and scholarly
communities do within their existing structures and mandates that is in
alignment with a contemporary understanding of access to justice. However,
180 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Sandefur, Legal Advice from Nonlawyers: Consumer Demand, Provider
Quality, and Public Harms, 16 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 283, 284–285 (2020); Gillian K. Hadfield &
Deborah L. Rhode, How to Regulate Legal Services to Promote Access, Innovation, and the Quality of
Lawyering, 67 HASTINGS L. J. 1191, 1194 (2016) (arguing that current regulations make legal
practice inefficient and expensive, reducing access). With regard to the implications for legal
technology that might expand access to justice, see, for example, SANDEFUR, LEGAL TECH, supra
note 112, at 16 (noting how the regulatory regime inhibits the development of effective digital
legal technologies); Benjamin H. Barton, Technology Can Solve Much of America’s Access to Justice
Problem, If We Let It, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 30 (2016).
181 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 181.
182 See, e.g., Letter from Debra L. Stephens, Chief Just., Wash. St. Sup. Ct., to Stephen R.
Crossland, Chair, Ltd. License Legal Tech. Bd., Rejeev Majumdar, President, Wash. St. Bar
Assoc., and Terra Nevitt, Interim Exec. Dir., Wash. St. Bar Assoc. (June 5, 2020) (reporting the
Washington State Supreme Court’s decision to terminate the Limited Legal Technician program
in light of the “overall costs of sustaining the program and the small number of interested
individuals”).
183 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (limiting fee-sharing).
184 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (imposing an ethical
obligation to provide pro bono publico services).
185 By highlighting the role of law schools, I do not wish to denigrate the valuable
contributions of other disciplines.
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there is a need for additional institution building to support the emergence of
access to justice as a field. In the law school context, for example, hiring
decisions, curricular design, and law school clinic operations can all be oriented
to support an evidence-based understanding of access to justice.186 The rise of
new law-school-affiliated institutions focused explicitly on the promotion of
access to justice187 offer the potential for even greater advancement of the field.
Similarly, public entities like the National Science Foundation and the Fulbright
Program and private grant-making institutions including the Russell Sage,
Carnegie, Open Society, and MacArthur Foundations have all provided
important support to scholars doing work on access to justice.188 However,
support that is exclusively focused on access to justice scholarship is much
rarer.189 Finally, while several academic organizations provide opportunities for
access to justice scholars to network and share their research, events and

See, e.g., Andrew M. Perlman, The Public’s Unmet Need for Legal Services & What Law Schools
Can Do About It, DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 75 (“They can teach the next generation of lawyers
more efficient and less expensive ways to deliver legal services, ensure that educational debt does
not preclude lawyers from helping people of modest means, and conduct and disseminate
research on alternative models for delivering legal services.”); Martha F. Davis, Institutionalizing
Legal Innovation: The (Re)Emergence of the Law Lab, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 190, 199 (2015) (describing
the potential of law labs).
187 See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUST. AT FORDHAM L. SCH., https://ncforaj.org/;
Center for Access to Justice, GA. ST. U., https://law.gsu.edu/faculty-centers/center-for-access-tojustice/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2020); Center for Access to Justice and Technology, CHICAGO-KENT C.
L., https://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/institutes-centers/center-for-access-to-justice-and-technology
(last visited Nov. 25, 2020).
188 See, e.g., SANDEFUR, LEGAL TECH, supra note 112, at 3 (acknowledging funding support
from the Open Society Foundations for data collection effort regarding “existing digital
technologies that assist with justice problems in US jurisdictions”); Award Abstract #1839537,
Workshop: Computing, Information Science, and Access to Justice, NAT'L SCI. FOUND. (Jun 30, 2020),
https://nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1839537&HistoricalAwards=false;
Award Abstract #1823791, Access to Civil Justice: Integrating and Advancing Theory and Practice (July
23, 2018),
https://nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1823791&HistoricalAwards=false;
Lois Lupica, Fulbright Research in Australia, UNIV OF MAINE SCH. L. (Mar. 15, 2019),
https://mainelaw.maine.edu/faculty/fulbright-research-in-australia/; Grants Database,
CARNEGIE CORP. N.Y., https://www.carnegie.org/grants/grants-database/grantee/emilyryo/#!/grants/grants-database/grant/137650180.0/; Rebecca Sandefur, MACARTHUR FELLOWS
PROGRAM (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.macfound.org/fellows/1022/; Tonya Brito, RUSSEL
SAGE FOUND., https://www.russellsage.org/visiting-scholars/tonya-brito (last visited Nov.
25, 2020).
189 But see, e.g., American Bar Foundation/JPB Foundation Access to Justice Scholars Program, Am.
Bar
Found.,
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/research/Fellowshipopportunities/ABF_JPB_Found
ation_Access_to_Justice_Scholars_Program0.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2020) (announcing
program “committed to building the field of access to justice research and creating a network
of access to justice scholars”).
186
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organizations explicitly dedicated to access to justice are less common.190
Expanding the institutional infrastructure for academic investigation of access
to justice—including our understanding of justiciable problems, responsive
behavior, and evidence-based interventions—could help to further promote a
contemporary understanding of access to justice.
CONCLUSION
Individuals’ ability to resolve civil legal problems affects their ability to
participate in society, escape poverty, and lead healthy and productive lives.191
Yet despite the importance of access to justice as a policy issue, it is largely
invisible.192 In part, this is a function of institutional design. Because earlier
definitions of access to justice focused on access—to courts, lawyers, and formal
law—the civil justice system has been vested with primary responsibility for this
issue. Yet as a reactive institution concerned only with the small number of
justiciable problems that give rise to formal legal claims, the civil justice system
is ill-suited to deliver justice more broadly. Instead, what is needed are proactive
interventions that can address justiciable problems before they escalate, are
embedded within a larger net of social services, and take into account the
abilities and circumstances of those they are designed to assist. Implementing
these strategies requires that we radically alter the institutional landscape for
access to justice. In this Article, I offer several recommendations for how to do
so, including the creation of new institutions and the reorientation of others.
Together, these reforms could operationalize a new definition of access to
justice, one that is dedicated to equality in individuals’ ability to resolve civil legal
problems and achieve justice, within or without the courthouse walls.

***

190 But see, e.g., Collaborative Research Networks, Everyday Legality, LAW & SOC’Y ASS’N (last
visited Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.lawandsociety.org/crn.html#39 (describing research
network for, “scholars who study everyday approaches to legality: how people understand,
perceive, and think about different aspects of law and legal situations, the degree to which
legality structures social life, and the consequences of those understandings for individual and
organizational action”).
191 Pleasence & Balmer, supra note 24, at 140–143 (noting that justiciable problems can limit
individuals’ “capability to function effectively in society”).
192 Caplan, supra note 130, at 28.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3773280

